Come Back Monday

"But, I cain't GIT a housin' assessment!" 

"You say you're single?" 

"Yes ma'am."  

"Veteran?" 

"No ma'am.  Wouldn't take me."  

"Fleeing domestic violence?

"Howzat ma'am?  Fleein' what?"

"How long have you been living outside?"

"Ten year, I reckon.  Cain't take it no more. Gettin' too old."  

"You have a case-worker?"

"I reckon not, ma'am, been livin' up d'canyon, most of it."

"Where are you now?" 

"Woods."  

"You'll need to be assessed."  

"What fer?"

"Housing.  It's how you get on the list when something comes available."

"What list?"

"The prioritized housing list.  It's like a wait list, but it's called an interest list, don't ask me why."

"Yes ma'am." 

"Let me just check...looks like you will need to make an appointment to get assessed at HOAP on Church Street on Tuesdays or Thursdays between 9 and 3, and at Church at the Park on Portland Road on Mondays through Fridays between 11 and 1."

"I ain't too good wid 'ppointmunts.  How 'bout now?"  

"It's after 2.  You'll have to come back Monday, if you can get an appointment."  

"But I ain't got a ride on Monday.  I only got a ride today, n' I cain't drag dis here laig tree mile n' back nohow.  How 'bout you assess me?"

"I'm not certified to do assessments."  

"Cain't you jes' take m'name 'n stick me onter dat list?"

"No, I can't.  You have to be assessed so they know what sort of housing is appropriate.  

"I reckon I'll take enytin' wid a roof."  

"It's not that simple.  You have to be enrolled in something called "coordinated entry."  And they have to know where to find you when your name comes up, which may take some time, depending."

"Dependin' on what?" 

"On your assessment score, and available housing, and whether you've recently been engaged in services."

"Services?  Like church services?"

"No, like going to HOAP or The ARCHES Project to check your mail."  

"But, I don't get no mail.  Nobuddy gets mail no more."

"You still have to check in from time to time, so they can make a note in they system, so they know where you are."

"But I cain't get in town reg'lar.  It's lack I done told you, ma'am, it's hard fer me to git 'round." 

"I'll see if one of the outreach teams can check on you."  

"Thanky, much obliged."  

"But you'll still have to come to town sometime, because the outreach teams don't make a habit of noting contacts in the system."  

"Law.  I reckon they'll note it well enuff when they find me daid."  

"Is there anything else I can help you with?"  

"No ma'am.  I reckon you've give me no morn' I deserve."      

_________________________________________

Alliance Director Elaine Lozier, responding to the charge that Alliance leadership is ill-equipped to confront serious problems of the sort identified in the recent review of Marion and Polk's Coordinated Entry program:

To fulfill our responsibilities well, and in a manner responsive to the needs of our community, the CoC continues in its ever-evolving process to foster true collaboration among its partners and within its governance. This past year, we have focused on deepening relationships with organizations inside and outside the CoC and clearly communicating common goals and priorities by re-visiting our mission and
purpose, creating a vision and designing a 5 year strategic plan. We also agreed upon shared values for how we will go about our work (Collaboration, Stewardship, Inclusion, Compassion, Leadership, Commitment and Adaptability).

                                                                                                    ---Elaine Lozier, 10/11/24

The Struggle to Count Bodies & Beds

 By Sarah Owens and Michael Livingston

Every January, hope springs anew in communities across the country that they may be successful in the struggle to give an accurate accounting of all their homeless beds and bodies.  

Donations are solicited and warehoused, volunteers recruited and trained, and, to a greater or lesser extent, the count has been publicized in print and social media.  "The day of the count" will, usually, get heavy media coverage, even though the counting will continue for up to two weeks. 

The results, however, have tended to get very little, if any, attention.  Certainly not in Marion and Polk counties, which have historically been very slow to publish results compared to other geographic areas, or doesn't publish them at all, which happened in 2020.  

The state agency, the Oregon Housing and Community Services Department, publishes only odd-year counts, by county, but buries them deep in the OHCS website under a tab for providers, in inconsistent formats that make detailed comparisons difficult.  

Polk (L) and Marion (R) counties 2015-2017 PITC Summaries

 

Polk (L) and Marion (R) counties 2019 PITC Totals

So, what happened to the report on Marion and Polk's 2020 count -- the very first count for the newly-formed Mid-Willamette Valley Homeless Alliance?  See "The Pointless Point-in-Time Count."  24 December 2019.  

After asking Alliance staff repeatedly for several months when the 2020 PITC report would be published, and finally being told (incorrectly) "it's on the website", we decided to compile our own report, using raw data and the format that MWVCAA has used in prior years.  Turns out, the 2020 count showed a deep (>50%) drop in sheltered homelessness from previous years, and a significant (~10%) drop in overall homelessness from 2019.     

 

Realizing those figures couldn't be right, we asked MWVCAA Executive Director Jimmy Jones by email "what happened" with the 2020 count.  Here's what he told us.

The 2019 PIT Count showed 121 homeless persons in Polk and 974 in Marion, for a total in both counties of 1,095. The transition from a ROCC to a local process produced some confusion as there were a lot of people who were new to their roles.  The 2020 count showed 998 [homeless] persons [total], which is about a 10 percent reduction from the prior year.  Nothing fundamentally changed in the homeless population in Marion and Polk between 2019 and 2020.  The 10 percent decline was a product of new people in new roles, the transition to a new COC, and the use of a new technology platform also played a role. The shelter count was especially inadequate. And then, we have to come to terms with the fact that [the Homeless Management Information System (HMIS)] in Oregon is completely unreliable. I have no confidence in the ultimate numbers that are produced by the state.  In recent years they’ve had to make adjustments to make the numbers they have in their system, and the numbers reported to HUD, match.   Until we have a competent statewide system the numbers are unreliable.

So why then are we doing a full count in 2021?  [HUD offered to grant CoCs waivers that would relieve them of the requirement of conducting a 2021 unsheltered count, but the Alliance chose not to seek a waiver.]

Because the community has to make a better effort at getting this right and we can’t wait til 2022 to figure out how to do it the right way.  [An unsheltered count is required only in odd-numbered years.]   Unsheltered homelessness will continue to get worse the next decade, and state and federal funding formulas will bend increasingly heavily toward point-in-time counts, especially if there are additional future increases in the Emergency Solutions Grant, which during COVID have been [awarded in proportion to community need based on communities'] unsheltered counts.  There are a lot of reasons not to do a count this year, and I would have opposed it but for the simple fact that the window HUD gives us is a full two weeks under these [pandemic] conditions.  That dramatically increases the odds of getting something closer to a[n] accurate count.   We also have next to no information on how much our homeless population has increased because of the wildfires. I think it’s greater than people believe and we need to be able to prove that now.

We asked Jones to say more about his assessment of Oregon's HMIS as completely unreliable.  (HMIS is a shared database that is used to track individuals entering and exiting the homeless services system, and is supposed to let communities know how well or poorly their homeless services system is functioning.)  Basically, his view is that the reports generated in HMIS should be viewed with skepticism.  Ask about the report's design (what data was included and what data was excluded) and the margin of error.  Ask about the report's history of reliability, and whether any program-level staff have signed off on this particular report, and if so, what, if anything, did they think the numbers signify.  Don't just accept a report at face value. 

With that caveat, we turn to a less known, but equally important, metric:  the Housing Inventory Count, or HIC, which also occurs in January, and is designed to inform communities about their homeless shelter and housing programs.  The HIC tells communities how many beds they have, of what type, and the extent to which providers and programs are participating in HMIS. 

Marion and Polk counties started 2020 far behind where we should have been in terms of HMIS "bed coverage."  See "HMIS and Bed Usage Rates", revised January 2019.  Last January's HIC demonstrated what was known already -- i.e, that the Alliance had a lot of HMIS "on-boarding" to do with providers before it could begin to compete as a CoC.  In this respect, the Alliance's greatest accomplishment in 2020 was adding Simonka Place, a program of the Union Gospel Mission of Salem that serves women and children, to the number of providers participating in HMIS.  

That said, because UGM's men's programs won't be added until later this year, when the new Men's Mission opens, the Alliance will be falling short of HUD's 85% bed-coverage benchmark in Emergency Shelter (44%) and Transitional Housing (61%) types this January.  This failure means the Alliance will fall short on the 2021 System Performance Metrics, or SPMs, that are based on ES and TH data (which is to say, most of them).  That's in addition to the reliability problems that Jones identified.  To find out more about plans for the 2021 PITC, visit the Alliance web page here.

The Pointless Point in Time Count

By Sarah Owens and Michael Livingston

OHCS's 2019 PITC data "tableau"

Every year, the Mid-Willamette Valley Community Action Agency (MWVCAA) organizes volunteers in Marion and Polk counties to survey unsheltered individuals.  The survey requires the volunteers to ask people they've mostly never met a series of highly personal questions, often in exchange for a meal, sleeping bag, tarp or other camping equipment.  This "count" of unsheltered homeless is one part of the annual Homeless Point in Time Count (PITC) that's required by HUD as a condition of receiving Continuum of Care program dollars.  Because it's so labor and resource intensive, HUD requires communities to do the unsheltered count only in odd-numbered years.  MWVCAA, however, conducts the unsheltered count every year.

Last January, "everybody" thought the count had netted a record number of unsheltered homeless -- over 800 -- in Marion and Polk counties.  See Whitworth, W. "Homeless PIT Count shows 20 percent increase in Marion, Polk Counties, with big caveat."  (15 February 2019, Statesman Journal.)

Unfortunately, what was reported to HUD was that Marion and Polk had counted less than 600 unsheltered individuals.  The problem?  The 28-county Rural Oregon Continuum of Care or "ROCC."

As has long been known, ROCC is an organizational disaster that cripples effective homeless services delivery at the local and regional levels, and the weakest of its weak links is its data.  As was reported to the Housing Stability Council this month,

12/6/19 OHCS Memo to Housing Stability Council at 95

This year, after ROCC finished mangling Marion and Polk's 2019 PITC data, it reported to OHCS and HUD that the total number of homeless individuals in Marion and Polk counties was not 1,462 (rough count), but 1,095 (official count).  That is to say, instead of the 20% increase over 2018 reported by the Statesman Journal, the *official* 2019 numbers reflect a decrease.  (The total count in 2018 was 1,218 but OHCS and HUD don't recognize even-year counts.  The last recognized unsheltered count was in 2017 and totaled 1,151 individuals.  See OHCS's 2015-2017 PITC data "tableau.")  To see OHCS's analysis of the official statewide data, see here.

Statesman Journal 1/30/19

ROCC isn't the only problem with the PITC.  As one might imagine, not everyone is comfortable sharing highly personal information with total strangers, as is required by the unsheltered count.  As we reported in "Seven-day PIT Count Nets Record Unsheltered", there was last year "a widespread feeling [among providers and volunteers] that campers are now actively avoiding the annual survey."  But, when we ask those most involved in the annual count whether it wouldn't be better if providers forgot about trying to do the unsheltered survey/counting in the off years, and just spent the last week in January focusing on meeting basic needs and building trust, they all say they want to keep doing it.  Why?  Because they believe there's something about doing "the count" that brings in the volunteers.  In other words, they believe they need to manipulate people to get them to show up. 

Call for volunteers for the 2018 unsheltered PITC

There's no real problem with counting the "sheltered" homeless every year.  That data is fairly easy to pull together, and we should do it as long as HUD requires it.  But, in even years, it makes less and less sense to conduct an unsheltered count.  Especially when HUD doesn't require it, and when there is more reliable data available elsewhere.  According to Jimmy Jones, MWVCAA Executive Director, we know from data collected through ServicePoint, Oregon's Homeless Management Information System, that Salem alone has about 1,800 homeless individuals inside the Urban Growth Boundary, 1,400 of whom are unsheltered (400 in cars, 1,000 outside).  See "Camping Ban for Christmas." 

As we have a very good idea how many unsheltered there are in Salem, there's no justification for sending people in even years into the Canyon or the woods outside Woodburn or Dallas, looking for camps and upsetting people who just want to be left alone.  There's no point in collecting "data" that won't be used.

The 2020 PITC is especially going to be an exercise in futility.  Law enforcement have dispersed (and dispersed, and dispersed) the nearly 200 people who for years lived in the area around Wallace Marine Park.  Last year, they were counted, but they won't be this year.    

In 2020, and in all even years, volunteers should simply be asked to help out at the Salem Community Homeless Connect or the Santiam Outreach Community Center or one of the warming centers in the Polk County or City of Salem warming networks.  If, as Jones has said on multiple occasions, community resources for the homeless are well and truly spread "like butter over warm toast", the answer cannot continue to be, "We've always done it this way."  

1/5/21 update:  as of this writing, Marion and Polk county's re-created CoC (OR-504), called the Mid-Willamette Homeless Alliance, has yet to publish the 2020 PITC data, probably related to significant unforced errors in its collection, both sheltered and unsheltered.  

1/18/21 update:  find our report based on data provided by ROCC staff here. 

"Coordinated Entry" After One Year

Revised: January 2019

 

By Sarah Owens and Michael Livingston

Woodburn Service Integration Team

The Mid Willamette Valley Community Action Agency (MWVCAA) and The ARCHES Project "just completed our first year of Coordinated Assessments and referrals for Marion and Polk County."  See here at 6.

At the November meeting of the Woodburn service integration team, Patricia Godsey with WVCH, the local CCO, passed along advice she'd heard at the Statewide Housing Plan roll out, to have homeless/at risk clients assessed by ARCHES' coordinated entry staff.

Asked what being assessed did for the clients -- did it get them on a wait list for housing? or were the assessments mostly data collection for ARCHES? -- Godsey said she didn't know, that someone from ARCHES would need to answer that question.  So, the facilitator turned to Rosa Ramirez, the Resources Coordinator for Marion County, who has been praised for "attending the newly-established Service Integration Team meetings as an integral partner" (see here at 6), and asked her if she could help out.  Ramirez said, "I can't talk about that", indicating she didn't know enough about the coordinated entry program to be able to talk about it.

September Report of the CRP Director

While The ARCHES Project may have a list with some very useful aggregate data, it's just a list unless providers have agreed to rely on it for referrals.  To our knowledge, only one housing provider accepts referrals exclusively from the "Master By Name List" -- the Salem Housing Authority for its Homeless Rental Assistance Program.  So, unless your client is a highly vulnerable, chronically homeless individual, s/he is unlikely to benefit from being assessed.

Does that mean you shouldn't send your medium needs client to be assessed?  No.  It just means you shouldn't do it assuming your client is going to benefit from it. 

The fact is that assessments don't actually benefit most clients -- take the text of the flyer circulated last July (at left), for example.  It doesn't require being "spdatted" to "find out if you're eligible" for ARCHES programs.  That's always been done through ARCHES' "pre-screening" process.  (A little over a year ago,  ARCHES stopped accepting electronic applications, and changed its intake policy to require in-person administration of the VI-SPDAT, available only one day per month in some rural areas.)

Adding to the confusion, MWVCAA uniquely defines CES as "A national HUD mandate to develop a collaborative system for assessment and prioritization to improve the efficiency of homeless services on a community basis."   (No mention of referrals.) (See here at 17.) 

HUD, on the other hand, defines a coordinated entry system as "A centralized or coordinated process designed to coordinate...assessment and...referrals."  (See right.)  

As discussed in a previous blog, this  area lacks a true coordinated entry system (CES) in part because implementation essentially requires participating housing providers to use ServicePoint, which, for various reasons, has been a problem.  To be useful providers must have access to the data, the way doctors have to be able to access medical records.  Imagine trying to treat someone for a medical condition without access to their medical records.  That's largely how homeless services delivery operate in this area.  So while it's been helpful for analysis and planning purposes to have the picture of homelessness that The ARCHES Project staff have been able to develop through data gathering, we have a long way to go before we have a true "no wrong door" approach to homeless services delivery in this area.

See comments on this post at the Salem City Council FB Group.

MWVCAA's Community Resource Program

Revised: January 2019

By Sarah Owens and Michael Livingston

The news from the continuum this week is about "the best", the "all", the "every" and the "enormous" "monumental" and "never before possible" that is the Mid Willamette Valley (MWVCAA)'s Community Resources Program (CRP).  At least that's how it's described in the August report of the MWVCAA's Community Resources Program (CRP), which the website describes as a "two-pronged program consisting of rural resource centers and housing services (RENT, ARCHES, Tenant-Based Assistance, Housing Stabilization Program and Housing Collaborative."

Since March, the CRP has been headed by Jimmy Jones, who succeeded Carmen Hilke, who held the post for less than a year.  Hilke's predecessor was Amber Reeves, who ran the program for several years before stepping down in May 2016 to accommodate her husband, Jon Reeves.  Reeves became Executive Director in May 2015.  Before Amber Reeves, CRP was headed by Carla Cary, who worked on the Marion and Polk County 10-Year Plan to End Homelessness, and is married Jon Weiner.  Weiner is the vice chair of the MWVCAA Board of Directors.   

In 2016, CRP's budget was around $2M.  It more than doubled in 2017, thanks in part to the Oregon legislature's decision to push out more funds for housing and homeless assistance.

To get a feel for what the CRP does with all those resources, we took a look at its monthly report to the MWVCAA Board of Directors.      

CRP claims to be helping Municipal Judge Jane Aiken (sister of United States District Court Judge Ann Akiken) is make progress on her project to create a homeless diversion program.

CRP claims their staff have agreed to enter clients from area shelters into ServicePoint, Oregon's Homeless Management Information System software application.

Just how CRP staff will accomplish this task isn't clear.  Will shelter staff have access to their clients' information in ServicePoint?  Will HUD recognize the arrangement with the shelter as "participation in HMIS" for purposes of the Housing Inventory Count?    

CRP makes strong claims about the benefits of what CRP calls its "Coordinated Entry Program", which has been funded with CoC Program dollars.  The year-old program, which is apparently not "signature" enough to be listed on the CRP webpage, consists entirely of consultation (across the other 26 counties of ROCC) and data collection services (here in Marion & Polk)(referred to in the report as "the research project").  The claims (for instance, the claims that the program has demonstrated "the social utility of a data-driven, research based approach to homeless services" and "had enormous impact on homeless services around the state") are not supported by any data in the report.        

A functional coordinated assessment and entry system (CES) is required for certain HUD programs, and for the effective delivery of homeless assistance.

However, here in Marion and Polk Counties, homeless housing providers as a whole have yet to agree to, or implement, a CES, in part because implementation essentially requires participating providers to use ServicePoint, which, for various reasons, has been a sticking point.  CRP's alleged workaround, whereby CRP staff will enter enter non-participating providers' data themselves, would seem to be both impractical and unsustainable.

In addition to the Community Court project mentioned above, the ServicePoint participation workaround, the Rapid Rehousing, Coordinated Entry, and Veterans Rental Assistance Programs, the Westcare Veterans Home, HRAP and Dallas Resource Center support, the planning/development of the Commercial Street project, RENT tenant education and tenant-based rental assistance to the rural areas (not discussed above), CRP is a "partner" in delivering reentry services in Marion County, and, perhaps more importantly, is supposed to deliver nine different state homeless/housing programs (Emergency Housing Assistance (EHA), EHA-Document Recording Fee, EHA Vet-DRF, Emergency Solutions Grant (ESG) (federal pass-through), Housing Stabilization and Fresh Start Housing Programs (delivered in partnership with DHS), Low Income Rental Housing Fund (LIRHF), State Homeless Assistance Program (SHAP) and Elderly Rental Assistance (ERA)) worth over $2M annually (a rough estimate based on incomplete information), and see to it that MWCAA fulfills its "lead agency" responsibilities to the City of Salem and ROCC Region 7 CoC grantees by ensuring compliance with HUD CoC and ESG program regulations, including homeless outreach efforts (e.g., visiting known homeless encampments and participating in Community Connect, Veterans Stand Down and extreme weather shelter events), expanding ServicePoint participation, establishing a local coordinated assessment and entry system, conducting and reporting on the annual Point in Time Homeless Count and Housing Inventory Count, and making regular program reports to HUD and OHCS.  In addition to all that, CRP staff are expected to lead or participate in community meetings (e.g., Coordinated Entry Work Group, Health and Housing Committee, Salem Homeless Coalition, Emergency Housing Network, as well as meetings like Silverton Together out in the rural areas) and fundraising activities (car washes, golf tournaments, fun runs, etc.), maintain contact with the media (CRP report cites Salem Weekly and The Guardian), and manage an internship program.  All this with a full-time staff of 29, according to the CRP Report.

Should we be impressed?  Well, certainly, CRP is trying to do a very great deal.  But, what everyone really wants to know is whether all this effort and activity is having any effect.  Unfortunately, that question cannot be answered, because, for all its claims about the enormous impact of its programs,  the August CRP report did not include any year-end program information or analysis, but only the last quarter's raw data on individuals served by the state programs, which is just not very informative.  Here's the kind of report you'd expect to see:

      
Here's a sample of the raw data in the report:

If CRP truly believed in "the social utility of a data-driven, research based approach to homeless services", it would be reflected in their current reporting and analysis.  The community doesn't need more hype.  Neither does MWVCAA's Board of Directors.  The August CRP report is mostly hype.  It doesn't begin to provide the information or analysis needed to make a serious assessment.   

Is Your State Hless Assist Program Working? How Can you Tell?

By Sarah Owens and Michael Livingston

In Oregon, all federal antipoverty and state housing/homeless assistance funds (e.g. Emergency Housing Assistance (EHA) and State Homeless Assistance Program (SHAP)) are delivered through Community Action Agencies (CAAs). 

Of the 17 CAAs that serve Oregon's 36 counties, only 3 are public (Lane, Multnomah, Clackamas).  The rest are private non-profit agencies, perhaps  more appropriately described as "quasi-public" agencies (a quasi-public agency is a publicly chartered body that provides a public service and is overseen by an appointed board, commission, or committee).

Although it's through the local CAAs that these programs are delivered (on the theory that these things are best left in local control), it's the Oregon Housing and Community Services Department (OHCS) that's charged with program administration.  This relationship -- the one between CAAs and OHCS -- is not especially well understood.  Consider, for example a recent discussion at a meeting of the AOC Housing subcommittee where, according to the staff summary, members wanted to know:

1. What is the link to the non-profit organizations that utilize EHA/SHAP?
2. How is the impact of these state funds reported to the state?
3. What outcome measures are used to measure statewide impact of EHA/SHAP?

Here's how their trade association explained things: 

1. The community action network includes 18 [sic] community action agencies (sometimes referred to as CAAs) that serve all 36 counties in Oregon. While the majority of community action agencies are non-profits, three are public and housed in county government. The ‘public CAAs are in Multnomah, Clackamas and Lane county. Because community action believes the greatest impact occurs at the local level, many CAAs, including the public CAAs subcontract with community based organizations, culturally based organizations and faith based groups to deliver services that meet local needs. It is this relationship that brings in a host of non-profit organizations, especially among the public CAAs.
   
2. OHCS distributes EHA/SHAP dollars to CAAs throughout the state by formula. Some of those dollars may be passed through to other non-profits doing homelessness prevention/service work in the community. Those non-profits are required to report back to their local CAA on how the funds were spent,  how many people were served and the outcomes achieved. Community Action Agencies then do a similar type of reporting to Oregon Housing and Community Services (OHCS) that includes the data they received from the non-profit partners in their communities.
   
3. OHCS compiles this data. One of the purposes for this collection is to report to the legislature on Key Performance Measures related to their work.  [Bold emphasis added above.]

In brief, then, CAAs report the "impact" of homeless/housing assistance funds to OHCS, who compiles all the data and reports the result to the legislature.  Sounds very efficient, right?  Well, maybe.  But who reports the local data to the local communities? 

OHCS KPM #1

Key Performance Measures (KPMs), are reported in annual Progress Reports to the legislature.  The only OHCS KPM that relates to homelessness is KPM #1: the "percentage of homeless households [statewide] who exited into permanent housing and retained that housing for six months or longer."  Maybe (maybe) this measure tells legislators something, but it tells local communities nothing about what programs the state is funding in their community, how many dollars are involved, how the money's being spent and leveraged, what the return on investment is or what kind of outcomes they're seeing.

There's another report produced by OHCS that does contain local data.  It's produced biennially, and is supposed to report on the efforts of state agencies, OHCS included, to reduce the incidence of poverty in Oregon.  See ORS 458.505(6)(d) and the 2015 Poverty Report (dubiously titled, "Moving from Poverty to Prosperity in Oregon"). 

OHCS duties under ORS 458.505(6)(d)

In addition to reporting on efforts to reduce poverty, this biennial report is supposed to "describe the status of efforts by the department [OHCS] and the Department of Human Services to implement the state policy regarding homelessness."  See ORS 458.528.  The 2015 Poverty Report just reported the point-in-time homeless counts -- hardly what the legislature asked for.  (For those who don't know, the state policy regarding homelessness is that OHCS, DHS, the Oregon Housing Stability Council, and CAPO should "work to encourage innovation by state, regional and local agencies that will create a comprehensive and collaborative support system and housing resources vital for a successful campaign to end homelessness."  [Emphasis added.])

It's to be hoped that the 2017 Poverty Report will have something meaningful to say about the state's efforts to implement the state policy regarding homelessness (and will also change the title of the report to something more on point, like "How Oregon is Addressing Poverty and Homelessness in 2017.")  It is also to be hoped that, given OHCS has chosen CAAs to deliver its homeless/housing programs, it will begin to organize the Poverty Report around CAAs, or even CoCs, instead of counties. (Oregon's 2016 CAPER seems to suggest the latter might make the most sense.)

2015 Poverty Report

The point we are trying to make here is that OHCS is being fed all this data, but it's not being shared  effectively at the local level, and  neither the Progress Report, nor the Poverty Report, are telling local communities what homeless assistance programs the state is funding in their community, how many dollars are involved, how the money's being spent and leveraged, what the outcomes are or what the return on investment is.  Without that kind of information, "local agencies" cannot "create a comprehensive and collaborative support system and housing resources vital for a successful campaign to end homelessness." 

Now, maybe OHCS thinks CAAs are just naturally going to report relevant local data (e.g., the reports they're required to make to OHCS).  Maybe some do, but more don't, as indicated by the questions from the AOC Housing subcommittee referred to above.  Consider the fact that OHCS and the Community Action Partnership of Oregon (CAPO) are putting together a "Community Action Agency 101" course for OHCS's Housing Stability Council.  See here, beginning at page 15.  If CAAs were consistently sharing data and coordinating homeless/housing systems, a "101" for people with knowledge/experience in low-income housing would hardly be necessary.

MWVCAA FY2015 Annual Report

Most people we talk to know that Oregon's CAAs are not functioning as they should when it comes to sharing information on their homeless/housing programs.  Take, for example, our local CAA, the Mid-Willamette Valley Community Action Agency (MWVCAA).  Based on FY 2014 expenditures (sadly, the most recent numbers available), it's a pretty significant operation with a lot of employees.  It's also notoriously stingy with information about its homeless/housing programs, which are delivered through its Community Resource Program (HUD CoC, ESG, EHA, SHAP, HOME TBA, SSVF and DHS Child Welfare).  While we're told that CRP accounts for around 8% of overall expenditures, we're not told how those funds (about $1,790,000 in 2014) are spent, or in which programs.  And if there were a problem with how funds were spent, we almost certainly would not be told. 

Early this past summer, MWVCAA began posting Board of Directors meeting materials on its website, but only because new Head Start performance standards required it.  Those materials contain some information about homeless/housing programs, but they hardly provide a complete picture.  So, it's a start, but more is needed.

2016 State Agencies Expenditure Report

Oregon gets good marks for spending transparency.  For example, we can know to the penny what the state paid the Director of OHCS in 2016 for mileage, for meals, or for attending conferences.  But the only information on what the state paid our local CAA is a total: $3,467,543.  We have no idea which state program the funds came out of, or who was supposed to deliver services, or what the services were.  We don't even know if the funds were spent, or returned to the state.

Now, we're not suggesting that the State Agencies Expenditure Report is the best place to look for this kind of information.  We are suggesting only that it should be available somewhere.  We are also suggesting that the Oregon Housing Stability Council, along with OHCS, DHS and CAPO, have a responsibility under ORS 458.525 (at right) and ORS 458.528 to share relevant information about homeless/housing program administration with local communities, and to encourage, or require, CAAs to share relevant homeless/housing program delivery information with their local communities, because, in all likelihood, other CAAs across the state are not any better about sharing information than ours is.  It's not a requirement, so they probably just don't think about it.  But they absolutely need to be thinking about it, and OHCS should help them do that. 

In 2015, the legislature abolished the Interagency Council on Hunger and Homelessness, and moved responsibility for ensuring that homelessness relief efforts operate efficiently and effectively to the Housing Stability Council.  To carry out that responsibility, the HSC needs information.  Local communities have just as much need for the same kind of information at the community level.  Moreover, such information sharing is the only way the Oregon's policy on homelessness will ever be carried out.  Communities simply must be told what homeless assistance programs the state is funding in their community, how many dollars are involved, how the money's being spent and leveraged, what the return on investment is and what kind of outcomes they're getting.  It is not too much to ask, given the likelihood the reports exist, and are just not being published.  OHCS and the Housing Stability Council can and should ensure that local communities have access to the information they need to ensure that local homelessness relief effort operate efficiently and effectively.

Efforts to Build Local CES Stalled

Revised: January 2019

 

By Sarah Owens and Michael Livingston

[Originally posted under the title, "Launching a Local CES."]

Diagram Courtesy Jimmy Jones/MWVCAA

In May 2017, Jimmy Jones with the Mid Willamette Valley Community Action Agency (MWVCAA) began a series of meetings whose stated purpose was to develop a local coordinated assessment and entry system (CES).   Jones became Director of MWVCAA's  Community Resources Program in March.

Jones says homeless housing and service providers need a CES because that's the only scientific way to ensure that  emergency housing resources are spent wisely on people who need it most.  He maintains our local programs are currently unable to do that.  Is he correct?      

Until recently, it was anyone's guess.

We've long known that, save about 20 beds, area housing programs are designed to serve medium-needs clients.  However, until recently, we did not understand much about the needs of the homeless in our area.

Now, however, Jones has evidence that a very substantial segment of the homeless in our area are not medium-needs, but high needs.  Very high needs.  In fact, the proportion of high-needs homeless in this community turns out to be more than twice the national average.  Jones says that's in part because most local programs are not designed to serve those most in need, so the need has just continued to grow.

The diagram above illustrates the level of need in Marion and Polk Counties.  It is based on vulnerability assessments of 700 homeless individuals by Jones and MWVCAA staff.  Each one receives a score on a scale of 0 to 20, with 20 being the most vulnerable.  The dark blue line is a graph of all the scores.  Read as a clock, those with the highest needs start at 12 o'clock, and continue along the line clockwise to the center, and the lowest score.  As you can see, it's not until 6 o'clock (yellow arrow) that the level of need in this community begins to match available, medium needs, services.  Medium needs clients score between the red (10) and green (6) circles.

Jones's research says that the "average" client in Marion and Polk Counties scores at the top of the "medium" range for vulnerability, and two points higher than the national average.  Based on that data, one would expect the average Marion/Polk client to have greater difficulty, and take more time, moving from the typical medium-needs, transitional housing program to a stable placement.  This conclusion is supported by anecdotal evidence of UGM and Salvation Army staff about their guests' higher-than-average needs and longer-than-average stays.

So, how did we get here?

Jones says, historically, local programs have tended to accept, first come, first served, those who fit the program's service and screening criteria.  According to Jones, this approach has allowed programs to select lower needs clients from among the many seeking services, and not infrequently amounts to "cherry-picking."  But, as there has not until recently been any standardized assessment method, they sometimes get it wrong.  He says that putting higher needs clients in medium needs programs doesn't work, either.  It's comparable to giving a bed on a maternity ward to someone who needs dialysis.  It's not going to help the kidney patient, and it's going to deny someone maternity services.

How, then, can we as a community ensure that programs and services align with actual need? The answer is actually pretty simple.  First, we want to make sure there are programs designed to serve the full range of needs, but especially those with the highest needs.  Second, providers need to agree that everyone seeking housing and homeless services should be assessed for vulnerability and prioritized to receive services based on their score.  No more first come, first served.  Lower needs clients are diverted, medium-needs clients go into medium-needs programs, and likewise for high-needs clients, only there will actually be a program designed to stabilize them.  That's where the Mayor's Homeless Rental Assistance Program, or HRAP comes in.  That's why we need HRAP.

Now, obviously, the system of coordinated assessment and prioritization described in the preceding paragraph, in which everyone seeking housing and homeless services is assessed for vulnerability and prioritized to receive services based on their score, that system does not yet exist.  That's what this new series of meetings is intended to change.

How "on board" the provider community is with Jones's vision depends on who you ask, but it's probably safe to say they're skeptical.  Skeptical that there's a structural problem, even.  They're used to explaining failures in the system on a lack of resources.  They don't like anyone suggesting that they could be running their programs more effectively, or should be taking higher needs clients. 

Jones was not shy about his message.  He told providers their programs fell short on assessments, data collection and sharing, cooperation and coordination with other programs, outreach, permanent supportive housing, implementation of Housing First principles, shelter options, prioritization, efficiency, effectiveness and partnerships with government and businesses.  A system of coordinated assessment and entry, one participant said, would make their programs more effective, and their work work easier.  But the skepticism remained.

At the end of the hour and a half meeting (during which Jones did most of the talking), the participants were invited to return for a series of meetings designed to cover:  

Jun 13 - Data Sharing
Jul 11 - Housing Placements
Aug 8 - HMIS
Sep 12 - Federal/State Funding Sources
Oct 10 - Shelter Policies
Nov 14 - Special Populations
Dec 12 - "Outstanding Issues, Final Determination"

      
However, in September 2017, after four meetings (July was canceled), Jones informed those who were still in attendance that he didn't "see any point in meeting again."  He said much had been done since the group's first meeting in May, though "it was all accomplished outside the meetings."

Unfortunately, he did not describe the accomplishments with any specificity, and there is no record of them, including no written CES partnership agreements or standards.  

Beyond the PIT Count

Revised: January 2019

 

By Sarah Owens and Michael Livingston

Marion and Polk Counties are preparing for the 2017 Point-in-Time Homeless Count.  

Out in Polk County, they're getting ready for another Polk Community Connect event.  They're also going to hold a community forum on homelessness on January 19 out in Dallas (same location as the Connect). 

The PIT Count exists because the federal government seeks to allocate resources based on data.  To help us understand how we as a community might better meet the need for data, we've been corresponding with Jimmy Jones, who told us the PIT Count methodology used in Marion and Polk Counties needs some attention.

He pointed us to Yakima County, WA, and a pretty good story about the struggles Yakima County has had in getting good PIT Count numbers.  He said their population is about 250,000—which is smaller than what we have in Marion-Polk (about 400,000).  He told us, "It’s a very rural county in most regards, and getting folks in a central location to count them has been a struggle—not unlike what we’ve seen outside the urban footprint here in Marion-Polk." 

He also told us that, nationally, the counted homeless population in an urban area is between about .3 and .6 percent of the total population, and that using those figures, Marion-Polk should be counting between 1,200 to 2,400 homeless -- which are the “hard homeless”, meaning people living outside or in shelter.  He said, "assuming Marion-Polk has a roughly low-to-moderate [homelessness] rate (let’s say .38 percent), we should expect to count about 1,520."

"The actual number of 'hard homeless' is very likely closer to 2,000-2,200.  A full picture of homelessness in Marion-Polk would include people at all levels of vulnerability", he wrote.

Vulnerability is measured using intake assessment tools with names like "Vulnerability Index - Service Provider Data Assessment Tool" and "Vulnerability Assessment Tool", about which we've blogged previously.

And, Jones said, for every "literally homeless" individual (Category 1 below), one should expect to find another in Category 3 or 4.

"I think we can say that, at any given point, there are between  4,000 and 4,500 homeless folks (under all definitions) in Marion-Polk, which would make the homeless exactly .1 percent of the total population, which is a very conservative and reasonable estimate."

Jones also told us that Yakima has managed to cut their numbers considerably for several reasons:

1. They embraced coordinated entry and created a homeless network provider service.
2. They partnered with the housing authority, which gave them 100 vouchers for homeless clients,
3. They developed a good diversion plan, which targeted non-chronic populations (temporarily homeless folks). 

Jone wants to see Marion and Polk providers  embrace coordinated entry, and work collaboratively to improve the way they deliver of homeless housing and services.  To do that, though, they require data to assess need, both the type and the severity, and to support the allocation of additional resources.

Jones says good PIT Count numbers aren't sufficient.  So, since October 2016, he's been gathering other data by conducting intensive interviews with everyone seeking homeless services in our area.  He's assessed more than 450 residents (both counties), and expects to assess another 1,200 within the year.  Read more about his work and what he's finding here.    

Ending Homelessness with Data

Revised: January 2019

By Sarah Owens and Michael Livingston

Slide courtesy Jimmy Jones

This is what homelessness looks like in our community -- to a data analyst.

Since October 1, 2016, the Mid Willamette Valley Community Action Agency (MWVCAA)'s Jimmy Jones and others have assessed the vulnerability of more than 354 homeless individuals in 318 households containing 611 individuals, using a tool called the SPDAT.  So far, their scores range from 2 (less vulnerable) to 17 (very vulnerable).

The graph (left) plots the scores clockwise from highest to lowest.   

Those with scores inside the green and red circles (~5 to 9) are likely to be successful in transitional housing (TH) placements.  Those scoring higher -- which the graph shows is about half of those assessed, have much higher needs, and require permanent supportive housing to be successful.  Our community, meaning Marion and Polk Counties, has virtually no permanent supportive housing (PSH).

What happens when someone needs a certain level of support to succeed, and doesn't get it?  Well, obviously, they're going to fail.  We see that in the child welfare system, for instance.  Traumatized children who act out, lose interest in school, etc., because although they're getting basic-level care, they don't get the care they need.  It's the same situation in homeless housing system.  When we force highly vulnerable people in need of PSH into long-term resort to shelters and camping, they're not going to succeed; they're going to become what's called, "chronically homeless" and "service resistant."  This is the primary reason our community has a chronic homeless rate that is twice the national average, according to the most recent data collected by MWVCAA.  It's not just their failure, though, it's ours, too.  

How many Task Force recommendations address this problem?  Zero.

Data of this sort, which MWVCAA continues to collect, is absolutely vital if we are to understand and confront the problems in our community with realistic solutions.  For too long, the City of Salem has relied on the charity of the supporters of the Union Gospel Mission and Salvation Army to take care of its most vulnerable residents while it basically looks the other way, or worse, complains about their lack of success.  As the events of recent weeks have indicated, we've reached a tipping point.  And it's not because Portland is "busing their homeless to Salem", as much as we might like to think so.  Nor is it solely the result of the lack of affordable housing, though that's certainly a factor.  And, housing experts agree, it's going to get worse over the next few years.

It's nice that the City of Salem recently arranged to let UGM use its leased property at 770 Commercial Street (which served as an inclement weather shelter a couple of weeks ago) for its overflow, after Chief Niblock cut it to 28 from the previous no-one-turned-away in inclement weather.  But whereas UGM formerly could shelter up to ~300, now they've got only the 180 beds at the Mission, overflow capacity of 28, plus another 40-60 at 770 Commercial Street.  That's a net loss of ~50-30 shelter beds.  And keep in mind that up to one-half of those in, or seeking shelter, more than likely have higher needs that UGM can provide for.

It's a similar story at the Salvation Army's Lighthouse Shelter.  We spoke recently with one of TSA's co-directors, Captain Kim Williams, who came to Salem from Oakland, California about six months ago.  She told us she expected Salem's homelessness issues would not be nearly as severe as what she'd left in California.  She was surprised to learn that in fact, they're worse, particularly with respect to the severity of guests' mental health and substance abuse issues, and she's at a loss to know how to help many of them, given her program's (and the community's) limited resources.  Jimmy's data support her observations.     

Slide courtesy Jimmy Jones

UGM's Simonka Place takes in women and families with children. Jimmy's master list prioritizes based on SPDAT score (most vulnerable given highest priority).  There are, so far, 130 single female head-of-household families with a total of 138 children.  The average SPDAT score for those households is 9.88.  That's outside the range where transitional housing is appropriate. 

Graph at right shows how many of those women report a history of domestic violence.  

   
The takeaway here is that more shelters and more affordable housing are not going to address the needs of the most vulnerable -- and most visible -- in our community.  Neither is more transitional housing.  This community needs to make resources available for permanent supportive housing, and prioritize existing resources according to SPDAT scores.  We need to stop putting people where they can't succeed, stop trying to help them by giving them what we have available, and start trying to give them what they need to be successful.

To learn more about this subject, listen to the podcast of Michael's interview with Jimmy Jones.

Coordinated Assessment and Entry

Revised: January 2019

 

By Sarah Owens and Michael Livingston

The is the second of two posts about the tools needed to support a systematic approach to improving homeless services delivery.

The first post (here), introduced ServicePoint, a Homeless Management Information System (HMIS) application in use in Oregon, and showed how it can be used to monitor Bed Usage Rates (BURs).

This post covers coordinated assessjment and entry system (CES) basics. 

Coordinated assessment and entry (or, "coordinated entry", for short) is the "no wrong door" idea that recognizes it's just too not realistic to expect most clients to navigate all the available services on their own, trying to find the one that is appropriate to their situation.  No one disputes that services are too spread out, there are too many restrictions, forms, rules, and regulations, and the programs are too siloed.  

A lot's been written about "no wrong door" in the context of the Affordable Care Act, where privacy requirements continue to be a challenge to full implementation.  If you want to read about coordinated entry in the homeless assistance context, the best place to start might be with HUD's Coordinated Entry Policy Brief, which identifies the qualities of an effective coordinated entry system:

1. Prioritization
2. Low barrier
3. Housing First orientation
4. Person-centered
5. Fair and equal access
6. Emergency services
7. Standardized access and assessment
8. Inclusive
9. Referral to projects
10. Referral protocols
11. Outreach
12. Ongoing planning and stakeholder consultation
13. Informing local planning
14. Leverage local attributes and capacity
15. Safety planning
16. Using HMIS and other systems for coordinated entry
17. Full coverage

As noted elsewhere, ROCC does not have an effective coordinated entry system, and this has hurt its  ability to deliver homeless assistance, and to compete for HUD funding.  
       

ROCC's 2016 Consolidated Application

At left is ROCC's description to HUD of the coordinated entry elements ROCC does have or is working on.   Without question, the challenge of building a system inclusive of 28 counties (not all of them rural) continues in 2019 to be beyond ROCC's capabilities, despite all the hard work by Jimmy Jones, now Executive Director of the Mid Willamette Community Action Agency (MWVCAA), and his assessment teams, over the past two years.    

In 2016, Jimmy was just getting started.  He described his efforts as follows (edited somewhat for brevity and links added):

Basically we are moving toward a Coordinated Entry program that embraces (as close to best practices as resources allow) the principles embodied in the Coordinated Entry Policy Brief.  The first principle on that list is...prioritization of access, based on vulnerability.  We are determining vulnerability by means of the [Vulnerability Index - Service Prioritization Decision Assistance Tool] VI-SPDAT. For clients that are chronic[ally homeless] and score into PSH, we also have been using the VAT, as a tool for better case management and potentially, one day, opening or partnering with a PSH-Housing First facility, which would serve the highest scoring clients in our area.

The SPDAT is a fairly simple tool. Easy to teach, train and use.  It gives a score that has demonstrated very high correlation, when it’s been tested against other decision assistance tools.  It is widely used across the United States. I have attached a map of current usage. This map is a little older and doesn’t include many places that use the SPDAT...My previous employer has been using the VI-SPDAT for two years, in a county that has a very well developed coordinated entry and assessment program.  I have personally given more than 200 VI-SPDATS in the last year and I believe in it.  It’s not only descriptive of someone’s current situation, but it is also highly predictive of the kinds of case management and the nature of placement (PSH/TH-RRH/Diversion) that they’ll need.  Essentially it operates on a triage approach.  The original SPDAT was developed for use in hospitals, and the VI-SPDAT follows the same model—trying to direct resources to the people who need it the most. 

So while the SPDAT is a breadth tool, the VAT is a depth tool.  It was developed by DESC up in Seattle, who use it even for shelter (in a slightly different method).  This tool is basically designed to get a good measure of the most vulnerable clients.  It’s sometimes hard to differentiate between different PSH clients, trying to figure out (in essence) who has the highest risk of dying outside, without intervention.  The VAT requires specialized training. And each written assessment is then reviewed by another qualified and trained VAT reviewer.  I have completed 50 VATS in the last year, which is a pretty large number.  In one comparison of similar assessment instruments, the VAT had the highest validity ratio of any tool in the country.* * *

When Jimmy arrived at MWVCAA, The ARCHES Project stopped accepting electronic applications, and changed its intake policy of "first come, first served."  Instead, they use the VI-SPDAT at intake, which takes about 15 minutes for experienced staff.  If the client scores very high on the VI-SPDAT, they also use the VAT, which takes about 45 minutes to do, and another hour to write up.  Using these tools allows The ARCHES Project to prioritize those most in need of services, determine whether the services provided were effective, and, over time, establish a truer picture of homelessness in the community than exists now.  This involves entering the assessment data into Servicepoint, Oregon' HMIS application.

Thanks to the good work of Rena [Croucher at OHCS] and Hunter [Belgard, Portland Housing Bureau(up in Portland), we’ll...have a new coordinated entry entry-exit assessment in HMIS that we will use here in Mid-Willamette [Community Action Agency].  This will allow us to generate our base assessment and SPDATs inside HMIS.  Our Process here will be:

1)    Client comes into contact with our agency.

2)    We open and complete our entry-exit for coordinated assessment.

3)    We place our clients on a master wait list, priority determined by SPDAT score.

4)    Once a housing program selects the client for placement, our coordinated entry-exit is then closed, with an exit destination set to the new housing program.

In casual conversation (back in 2016), Jimmy told us he thought the picture of homelessness here in Salem would not be as bad as it was in Clark Co., WA, where he last worked, but after several months doing assessments at The ARCHES Project and elsewhere in the area, he's concluded it's probably worse, owing in large part to the presence of the Oregon State Hospital and area corrections facilities. He guesses, based on what he's been told about how MWVCAA conducts the annual Point-in-Time Homeless Count and the assessments he's done, that Marion and Polk Counties have something like 5,000 people experiencing some type of homelessness, half of whom are extremely vulnerable (lots of issues), half of whom are homeless more due to misfortune combined with tight economic circumstances.  He said this community just doesn't have the resources to deal with that more vulnerable population, and hasn't had the data required to demonstrate the need in order to get the resources.

Asked in January 2019 what he thought of his 2016 estimates, Jimmy said they were "pretty dead on", based on what he and his team had learned over the past couple of years.  "One thing that shocks me still is the larger number of unsheltered homeless women living in camps.  Closer to half female.", he said.  "The other thing is the physical health conditions for the nearly 300 [highest needs] HRAP-VAT clients turned out a bit worse than expected: not just the normal stuff like diabetes and heart conditions, but head traumas and weird stuff like mobility issues."  And, he now refers to area resources -- financial and organizational -- as "grossly inadequate."